Relational contracts-informal agreements sustained by reputational concerns-are prevalent both within and between firms. This paper develops repeated-game models of relational contracts that show how and why relational contracts within firms (vertical integration) differ from those between (non-integration). We show that integration affects the parties' temptations to renege on relational contracts, and hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain. In addition, our results offer new explanations for why a widely varying supply price often leads to vertical integration, and why incentives in firms are "lower powered" than in markets. Finally, our results have implications for non-standard organizations (such as joint ventures, alliances, and networks) and the role of management within and between firms.
Introduction
Firms are riddled with relational contracts: informal agreements and unwritten codes of conduct that powerfully affect the behaviors of individuals within firms. There are often informal quid pro quos between co-workers, as well as unwritten understandings between bosses and subordinates about task-assignment, promotion, and termination decisions.
1 Even ostensibly formal processes such as compensation, transfer pricing, internal auditing, and capital budgeting often cannot be understood without consideration of their associated informal agreements.
2
Business dealings are also riddled with relational contracts. Supply chains often involve long-run, hand-in-glove supplier relationships through which the parties reach accommodations when unforeseen or uncontracted-for events occur. 3 Similar relationships also exist horizontally, as in the networks of firms in the fashion industry or the diamond trade, and in strategic alliances, joint ventures, and business groups. 4 Whether vertical or horizontal, these relational contracts influence the behaviors of firms in their dealings with other firms.
1
Many observers have emphasized the importance of informal agreements in organizations, including Barnard (1938) , Simon (1947) , Selznick (1949) , Gouldner (1954) , and Blau (1955) .
2
See Lawler (1971) on compensation, Eccles (1985) on transfer pricing, Dalton (1959) on internal auditing, and Bower (1970) on capital budgeting.
3 Macaulay (1963) emphasized the importance of such "non-contractual relations" between various businesses. Dore (1983) was the first of many to describe Japanese supply relationships in these terms; see Cusumano and Takeishi (1991) , Nishiguchi (1994) , and Sako and Helper (1998) for recent contributions. In "Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization," Powell (1990) describes a variety of networks and emphasizes their differences from markets and firms; see Podolny and Page (1998) for a summary and critique of subsequent work. On alliances, see Gerlach (1991) and Gulati and Singh (1998) ; on joint ventures, Kogut (1989) and Pisano (1989) ; on business groups, Granovetter (1995) and Dyer (1996) ; and on "virtual" firms, Chesbrough and Teece (1996) .
Relational contracts within and between firms help circumvent difficulties in formal contracting (i.e., contracting enforced by a third party, such as a court). For example, a formal contract must be specified ex ante in terms that can be verified ex post by the third party, whereas a relational contract can be based on outcomes that are observed by only the contracting parties ex post, and also on outcomes that are prohibitively costly to specify ex ante. A relational contract thus allows the parties to utilize their detailed knowledge of their specific situation and to adapt to new information as it becomes available. For the same reasons, however, relational contracts cannot be enforced by a third party and so must be selfenforcing: each party's reputation must be sufficiently valuable that neither party wishes to renege.
5
In this paper we develop repeated-game models of relational contracts both within and between firms. We show how and why relational contracts within firms differ from those between. In particular, we find that integration affects the parties' temptations to renege on a relational contract, and hence affects whether a given relational contract is feasible. In some situations, the reneging temptation is lower in relational contracts between integrated parties; in others, the reneging temptation is lower in relational contracts between non-integrated parties.
This result motivates a new perspective on vertical integration: a major factor in the verticalintegration decision is whether integration or non-integration facilitates the superior relational contract. In short, integration is an instrument in the service of the parties' relationship.
Section 2 develops a model in which an upstream party uses an asset to produce a good that can be used in a downstream party's production process. We follow Grossman and Hart's (1986) terminology: when the upstream party owns the asset we call the transaction nonintegrated-the upstream party is an independent contractor, working with an asset she owns;
when the downstream party owns the asset we call the transaction integrated-the upstream party is an employee, working with an asset owned by the firm. We assume that ownership of the asset conveys ownership of the good. (In fact, the asset could simply be the legal title to the good.) Thus, if the upstream party owns the asset then the downstream party cannot use the good without buying it from the upstream party, whereas if the downstream party owns the 5 Accordingly, contracts we call "relational" are sometimes called "self-enforcing" (Telser, 1981; Klein, 1996) , "implicit" (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989) , or both (Bull, 1987) . Our use of "relational" follows the legal literature, particularly Macneil (1978) . Those who call relational contracts "implicit" naturally call formal contracts "explicit," but this usage risks connoting that implicit contracts are vague, when in practice it is often important that relational contracts be clearly understood.
firms. Our final result is that if spot transactions between non-integrated parties are sufficiently attractive then no relational contract is feasible between integrated parties, even if such a relational contract would be more efficient than the spot transactions. This result offers an explanation for why firms might abandon long-term employment relationships in favor of seemingly less-efficient outsourcing, as has been alleged in some of the downsizing episodes of the 1990s.
Section 5 concludes by discussing four additional ideas. First, we describe how our approach relates to the extensive sociological literature on the formal and informal aspects of organizational design. Second, we suggest how our approach might be applied to understanding emerging organizational forms such as joint ventures, strategic alliances, and business groups. Third, we explore the implications of our analysis for internal organizational processes such as transfer pricing, capital allocation, compensation, and corporate governance.
Finally, we argue that our focus on relational contracts suggests a natural role for managers in the economic theory of the firm: managers formulate, communicate, implement, and change relational contracts. Such management can be as important in relationships between firms as within.
Economic Environment
We consider an economic environment consisting of an upstream party, a downstream party, and an asset. Both parties and the asset live forever (or die together at a random date, as per the usual interpretation of "infinitely" repeated games). Both parties are risk-neutral and share the interest rate r per period. Initially, the downstream party owns the asset.
In each period, the upstream party may use the asset to produce a good. The downstream party values the good, but the good also has an alternative use. We assume that (because of unmodeled specific investments) the good's value to the downstream party always exceeds its value in the alternative use. (For example, there might be other similar downstream parties but the asset might be tailored to this downstream party's needs. Alternatively, the upstream party might be able to set up shop as a downstream party, but lack the expertise to do so efficiently.)
Regardless of how the good is used, its value falls to zero at the end of the period in which it was produced.
Ownership of the asset conveys ownership of the good produced using the asset. That is, if the downstream party owns the asset then the downstream party could simply take the good, refusing to pay the upstream party anything, whereas if the upstream party owns the asset then the upstream party could consign the good to its alternative use, paying no heed to objections from the downstream party. Of course, the latter scenario will not occur: because the value of the good to the downstream party exceeds its value in its alternative use, the efficient outcome when the upstream party owns the asset is for the parties to trade, exchanging money for the good.
Each period, the upstream party chooses a vector of n actions a=(a 1 ,a 2 ,...,a n ) at cost c(a).
The actions in a given period affect both the downstream value (Q) and alternative-use value (P) of the good in that period. In particular, the downstream value is either high or low (Q H or Q L ), the alternative-use value is either high or low (P H or P L , where P L < P H < Q L < Q H ), and the upstream party's actions affect the probabilities that high values will be realized:
Q L with probability 1-q(a)
P L with probability 1-p(a)
Given the upstream party's actions, the downstream and alternative-use values are conditionally independent. We assume that c(0)=0, q(0)=0, and p(0)=0, so that when the upstream party fails to take any actions, she bears no costs but also has no chance of realizing the high outcomes Q H or P H . We write ∆Q ≡ Q H -Q L and ∆P ≡ P H -P L .
The first-best actions, a*, maximize the expected value of the good in its efficient use minus the cost of actions, Q L + q(a) ∆Q -c(a), and so produce total surplus (1) S* ≡ Q L + q(a*)∆Q -c(a*).
The actions are unobservable to anyone but the upstream party, so contracts contingent on actions cannot be enforced. Achieving the first-best would still be possible if contracts dependent on Q could be enforced. We assume, however, that neither Q nor P is contractible: a contract that depends on the realized value of Q or P cannot be enforced by a third party. On the other hand, both Q and P can be observed by the upstream and downstream parties. There are therefore two potential ways to influence the upstream party's choice of actions: asset ownership and relational contracts. That is, if the upstream party owns the asset, she can negotiate with the downstream party over a sales price for the good. Alternatively, independent of who owns the asset, the realized values of Q and P can form the basis of a relational contract sustained by the parties' concerns about their reputations.
We follow Grossman and Hart in interpreting asset ownership as integration, but our static model differs from theirs in two important respects. First, the good produced by the upstream party has an alternative use, and the upstream party's actions can affect the good's value in this alternative use (∆P > 0). Although we assume that the good's value to the downstream party is always greater than its value in the alternative use (Q > P), under nonintegration the upstream party has an incentive to increase the good's value in its alternative use so as to improve her bargaining position with the downstream party. Second, we allow multitasking: in Grossman-Hart the central issue is how hard the upstream party works, whereas in our model [as in the related static models of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) Consistent with common usage, we refer to the vertically integrated case where the downstream party owns the asset as "employment," and the non-integrated case where the upstream party retains ownership as "outsourcing." We therefore call the four governance structures in Figure 1 "Spot Outsourcing" (where the upstream party owns the asset but there is no relational contract), "Spot Employment" (where the downstream party owns the asset but there is no relational contract), "Relational Employment" (where the downstream party owns the asset and there is a relational contract), and "Relational Outsourcing" (where the upstream party owns the asset and there is a relational contract).
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Holmstrom and Milgrom developed a static model in which an incentive contract is based on a performance measure that depends on one kind of action, but another kind of action changes the value of an asset used in the production process. Preventing the agent from owning the asset focuses the agent's attention on the performance measure; allowing the agent to own the asset distracts the agent, much as non-integration does in our model. Holmstrom and Tirole developed a static model of transfer pricing, in which the upstream division might or might not be allowed to sell its output outside the firm. Again, allowing the agent two sources of reward creates a distraction.
Figure 1
Combinations As in most of the incomplete-contracts literature, we acknowledge but do not model the role for formal contracts under all the ownership and governance regimes in Figure 1 . In particular, we interpret Q and P as representing the noncontractible elements of the exchange between the upstream and downstream parties, and assume that the contractible (i.e., observable and verifiable) elements are covered through formal contracts.
8
Several of the classic contributions to organizational economics can be described using Figure 1 . For example, static analyses of integration in the absence of relational contracting (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986 ) are analogous to our comparison of spot outsourcing to spot employment (the top row in Figure 1 ). Similarly, repeated-game analyses of relationships within firms (e.g., Kreps, 1990 ) are analogous to our comparison of spot employment to relational employment (the right column) and repeated-game analyses of relationships between firms (e.g., Klein and Leffler, 1981) are analogous to our comparison of spot outsourcing to relational outsourcing (the left column). Finally, Williamson (1975) emphasized that the comparative advantage of firms over markets lies in the firm's ability to enforce relational contracts, which is analogous to our comparison of spot outsourcing to relational employment (the main diagonal) and Williamson (1996, Chapter 4) emphasized the importance of relational 8
As an illustration of the potential importance of relational contracts even in the presence of formal contracts, see Blumenstein and Stern (1996) on how the 1700-page contract between General Motors and the United Auto Workers has important gaps that are covered by informal agreements. But note that our suppression of the formal contracts in our analysis ignores potential interactions between the noncontractible and contractible elements of exchange; see Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) and Bernheim and Whinston (1997) for analyses of such interactions.
contracts between firms as well as within, which is analogous to our comparison of relational outsourcing to relational employment (the bottom row). 
Outsourcing and Employment under Spot and Relational Governance
In this section we analyze the four governance structures defined in Figure 1 . These four separate analyses are preliminary to the comparative analysis we conduct in Section 4, but they allow us to derive our main proposition that asset ownership affects relational contracting.
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Spot Outsourcing
We first consider spot outsourcing. Once the actions are taken and the good produced, the upstream party either sells the good to the downstream party or uses the good in its alternative capacity. Although upstream and downstream cannot contract directly on the realized values of Q and P, they can negotiate over the price of the good. We use the Nash bargaining solution (with equal bargaining powers) to arrive at this price: downstream will pay upstream the alternative-use value, P j , plus half of the surplus from use by the downstream party, Q i -P j , so the price is 1 2 (Q i + P j ), where i=H,L and j=H,L.
The upstream party's payoff under spot outsourcing is the price 1 2 (Q i + P j ) less the cost of actions c(a). Upstream therefore chooses actions a SO to solve
The spot-outsourcing actions are thus likely to differ from the first-best actions. In our model, this can happen for two reasons. First, the upstream party can choose the wrong effort level.
9 Williamson (1985: 83) also emphasized relational contracts between firms, but construed them as lying on a continuum between markets and hierarchies. Figure 1 suggests that the set of alternative governance structures is two-dimensional, so it is not possible to locate all governance structures on a line between markets and hierarchies.
10 Garvey (1995) and Halonen (1994) also explore the effect of asset ownership on relational contracting, akin to our models of relational outsourcing and employment. Both Garvey and Halonen analyze repeated versions of the original Grossman-Hart model, whereas we allow the good's value in its alternative use to depend on the upstream party's actions. Also, Halonen assumes that ownership is fixed forever, even after reneging on the relational contract, whereas Garvey and we assume that ownership after reneging reverts to the efficient ownership at that point (with an appropriate transfer payment between parties).
Consider the extreme case when ∆Q=0, for example: the downstream party cannot benefit from effort, so the first-best level of effort is zero, but the upstream party will expend effort because P j influences the price of the good under Nash bargaining. In addition, however, even when ∆Q and ∆P are positive the upstream party may be induced to choose the wrong actions, exerting effort on activities that increase P even if they have no effect on Q.
More generally, our model clarifies an important point in the larger literature concerning underinvestment in specific assets. Asset specificity is usually measured in terms of the levels of asset values (for example, Q L -P H > 0 might be used as a measure of asset specificity in our model), whereas investment decisions are determined by margins (here ∆P and ∆Q). Hence, assets can be very specific (Q L >> P H ) and yet induce overinvestment (if ∆P >> ∆Q). This point is obscured in models that tie asset levels to marginal returns in such a way that asset specificity necessarily produces underinvestment.
After Q i and P j are realized and trade occurs, the downstream party's total payoff is Q i -
under spot outsourcing, conditional on upstream's optimal action choices. The total surplus under spot outsourcing is therefore
.
Spot Employment
When the downstream party owns the asset but there is no relational contract, the downstream party can simply take the output without paying the upstream party. In anticipation of this outcome, the upstream party will refuse to take any costly actions, so the downstream value of the output will be Q L with certainty. Thus, the total surplus from spot employment is S SE = Q L . Although we defer our main discussion of the comparative efficiency of spot outsourcing and spot employment until Section 3, we note that spot employment dominates spot outsourcing only when the net benefit from upstream actions under spot governance is negative, q(a SO ) ∆Q -c(a SO ) < 0. This could occur, for example, when the actions that affect the alternative-use value, P, are unproductive or even counter-productive to the downstream value Q, yet under spot outsourcing these actions are undertaken by the upstream party to improve her bargaining position.
Our model of spot employment may seem trivial and unrealistic: the upstream party refuses to take any actions whatsoever with respect to the noncontractible elements of exchange. But recall that we have ignored the possibility of formal contracts. One could add formal contracts, as in Holmstrom-Milgrom and Holmstrom-Tirole, and generate situations in which spot employment induces positive (although generally not first-best) effort. In our model, however, we leave out such formal contracts in order to focus on relational contracts.
Relational Employment
In relational employment, as in spot employment, the downstream party owns the asset.
But in our relational employment (like Simon's (1951) employment relationships) there is also a relational contract based on the observable but noncontractible realizations Q and P. We follow Bull (1987) and Kreps (1990) in constructing a repeated-game model of such a relational contract. Unlike the spot-employment case, the relational-employment contracts may provide upstream incentives, even though the downstream party owns the asset, provided that the parties value their reputations sufficiently. The core of the analysis is therefore checking whether reputation concerns in fact outweigh the temptation to renege on a given relational
contract.
An important part of this calculation is the payoff after reneging. We focus on triggerstrategy equilibria, in which the party who did not renege refuses to enter into any new relational contract with the party who reneged. Because there are only two parties (one downstream and one upstream), this trigger-strategy assumption implies that the parties live under spot governance forever after one reneges. To determine whether such spot governance takes the form of a spot outsourcing or spot employment, we allow the parties to negotiate over asset ownership after reneging. Thus, the downstream party will retain ownership when S SE > S SO , but will sell the asset to the upstream party (at a price determined by Nash respectively. For the moment, suppose that the upstream party is confident that the downstream party will indeed pay b i and β j (for i,j=H,L) as promised (and that the upstream party will make any promised payments if b i < 0 or β j < 0). If the upstream party accepts the contract, she will choose a vector of actions a RE to solve
so the total surplus generated under relational employment generating actions a RE is 
The upstream party reneges on the relational-employment contract by refusing to accept a promised payment (b i + β j ) when it was offered (or by refusing to make a promised payment if , yielding a present value of (S SO -S SE )/2r. Thus, the upstream party will honor rather than renege on the relational contract when 11 To derive the Nash bargaining price, define X as the asset price and note that the net surplus to the downstream party from selling the asset upstream rather than retaining ownership is X + (1/r)(D SO -S SE ), while the net surplus to the upstream party from buying the asset (rather than earning zero) is (1/r)U SO -X. The Nash bargaining price maximizes the product of these net surpluses.
If (6) holds for all i and j then it must hold for the largest b i + β j , while if (7) holds for all i and j it must hold for the smallest b i + β j . Combining these two extreme versions of (6) and (7) yields a necessary condition for the relational-employment contract (s,b H ,b L ,β H ,β L ) to be selfenforcing:
In fact, (8) is sufficient as well as necessary, because for any ∆b and ∆β satisfying (8), a fixed payment, s, can always be chosen that satisfies (6) and (7).
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The left-hand side of (8) (5), subject to the feasibility constraint (8). The resulting surplus can then be divided in any desired fashion through the salary payment, s, which has no effect on (8). Given functional forms for q(a) and p(a) and values for the parameters ∆Q, ∆P, and r, we could now determine whether (i) relational employment can achieve first-best upstream actions,
(ii) relational employment can survive (i.e., a self-enforcing employment contract can exist) but cannot achieve the first-best, or (iii) relational employment cannot survive (i.e., there are no values of ∆b and ∆β satisfying (8)). We do not pause here to explore these three possibilities because for many functional-form assumptions and parameter values some other organizational form (i.e., spot outsourcing, relational outsourcing, or spot employment) will be more efficient; see below.
Relational Outsourcing
We now consider relational outsourcing-relational contracts where the upstream party owns the asset. Such relational contracts between non-integrated parties have been analyzed by Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) , Klein and Leffler (1981) , and Telser (1981) , among others. In our model, relational contracts between non-integrated parties (outsourcing) differ from those between integrated parties (employment) in the ways they tempt each party to renege. If the promised payment b i + β j exceeds the price that would be negotiated under spot outsourcing, 1 2 (Q i + P j ), the downstream purchaser would be better off this period if he reneged on the relational-outsourcing contract. Similarly, if the promised payment b i + β j is less than 1 2 (Q i + P j ) then the upstream producer would be better off this period if she reneged.
Thus, a key difference between outsourcing and employment with relational contracts is that the good's value in its alternative use, P j , affects the reneging decision under relational outsourcing but not under relational employment. This difference drives our main Proposition, and several of our subsequent results.
A second difference concerns asset ownership after reneging: the efficient ownership structure after reneging is again determined by a comparison of the total surpluses in the two static cases, spot outsourcing and spot employment. Thus the conditions under which the asset changes hands after reneging under relational outsourcing are the reverse of those for reneging on the contract under relational employment. That is, if S SO > S SE then it is efficient for the upstream party to retain ownership: the upstream party will earn U SO in perpetuity, the downstream D
SO
. If S SO < S SE the upstream party will sell the asset to the downstream party at a Nash bargaining price of (S SE + U SO -D SO )/2r; thereafter, the upstream party will earn zero and the downstream party S SE in perpetuity.
If the upstream party is confident that the downstream party will honor the contract, the upstream party will choose a vector of actions a RO to solve
The expected total surplus under a relational-outsourcing contract is then
where D RO is the expected payoff to the downstream party under relational outsourcing.
Once the good has been produced and Q i and P j have been realized, the downstream party is supposed to receive the net payoff Q i -b i -β j . If he reneges on the relational-outsourcing contract, he negotiates to buy the good for the spot-outsourcing price of 1 2 (Q i + P j ) instead of for b i + β j , realizing a current payoff of Qi -1 2 (Q i + P j ). Depending on which spotgovernance mechanism is efficient, the downstream party may also need to buy the asset. 
Once Q i and P j have been realized, the upstream owner is supposed to the sell the good for the price b i + β j . If she reneges, she negotiates to sell the good for the spot price of 1 2 (Q i + P j ). If it is efficient for the upstream party to retain ownership of the asset then she receives a discounted future payoff of 1 r U SO . If it is efficient to sell the asset then she receives (S SE + U SO -D SO )/2r, after accounting for the sales price. The upstream party therefore will honor rather than renege on the relational-outsourcing contract when (11) 
Equations (10) and (11) define eight constraints that must be satisfied to ensure that both downstream and upstream parties will honor the relational-outsourcing contract for i,j=H,L.
However, all eight constraints will not be binding simultaneously. In particular, as shown in Appendix 1, the constraints can be combined into a single necessary and sufficient condition for the relational-outsourcing contract (s,b H ,b L ,β H ,β L ) to be self-enforcing:
Parallel to (8), the left-hand side of (12), |∆b-1 2 ∆Q| + |∆β-1 2 ∆P|, characterizes the total temptation to renege on the relational-outsourcing contract (again, the sum of the upstream . The efficient relational-outsourcing contract maximizes the total surplus S RO in (9), subject to the feasibility constraint (12). The resulting surplus can then be divided in any desired fashion through the salary payment, s, which has no effect on (12). Given functional forms for q(a) and p(a) and values for the parameters ∆Q, ∆P, and r, we could again determine whether (i) relational outsourcing can achieve first-best upstream actions, (ii) relational outsourcing can survive (i.e., a self-enforcing outsourcing contract can exist) but cannot achieve the first-best, or (iii) relational outsourcing cannot survive (i.e., there are no values of ∆b and ∆β satisfying (12)). We again defer our exploration of these possibilities.
We conclude this section by stating our main proposition.
Proposition: Asset ownership affects the parties' temptations to renege on a relational contract, and hence affects whether a given relational contract is feasible. Formally, the relational compensation contract (s,b H ,b L ,β H ,β L ) produces the aggregate reneging temptation |∆b| + |∆β| in (8) under relational employment but |∆b -1 2 ∆Q| + |∆β -1 2 ∆P| in (12) under relational outsourcing.
The proposition reveals that whether the parties are integrated or non-integrated affects their temptations to renege on a given relational contract. In some situations, the reneging temptation is lower between integrated parties; in others, the reneging temptation is lower between nonintegrated parties. This result motivates a new perspective on vertical integration, explored in detail in the next section: a major factor in the vertical-integration decision is whether integration or non-integration facilitates the superior relational contract.
Before exploring the implications of this proposition in Section 4, we pause to compare it to some of the work discussed in connection with Figure 1 above. For example, consider Kreps's model of corporate culture (or any other model of relational contracts within firms).
The words in Kreps's paper emphasize informal agreements within firms, but the repeatedgame model can be interpreted as concerning informal agreements between firms-say, the culture of a supply relationship. Similarly, consider Klein and Leffler's model of a supply relationship (or any other model of relational contracts between firms). The words in this paper emphasize informal agreements between firms, but the repeated-game model can be interpreted as concerning transfer payments between upstream and downstream divisions of a single firm.
In short, in a typical repeated-game model, it is unclear whether the relational contract is within or between firms. By including asset ownership in our model, we clarify this distinction and show that it matters: asset ownership affects the parties' temptations to renege, and so affects what relational contracts are feasible.
Our main proposition can also be compared to Grossman and Hart's perspective on integration. Although we adopt their assumptions that bringing a transaction inside a firm does not create any additional information, or render formerly non-contractible outcomes contractible, or change the preferences of any actor, we depart from their assertion that "the benefits of integration must surely be more than the ability to choose a new payment method" (p. 694). In our model, one important benefit of integration is precisely the ability to choose a new payment method (i.e., a different relational contract).
A Comparative Analysis of Organizational Forms
The preceding section characterized upstream action decisions and total surplus under four alternative governance structures. The total surplus under governance structure k is
where k = SE, SO, RE, or RO for spot employment, spot outsourcing, relational employment, or relational outsourcing, respectively. In a given environment, the efficient organizational form maximizes this joint surplus. For some parameter values, relational employment will be the dominant organizational form; for others, relational outsourcing will dominate; for still other parameters, neither relational outsourcing nor employment will be feasible and spot outsourcing or employment will dominate.
In this section we first derive three results related to our main proposition. We then solve two examples for which we compute and display the efficient organizational form as a function of parameters such as r, ∆Q, and ∆P. That is, for these two examples, we conduct the comparative analysis proposed by Coase (1937) and elaborated by Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 Williamson ( , 1996 : when will transactions occur within firms rather than between them?
Our first result is that vertical integration can be an efficient response to widely varying supply prices, even when all parties are risk neutral. This result helps explain a puzzle noted by Carlton (1979) and others: why would (risk-neutral) companies pursue vertical mergers to achieve certainty of supply? We show that under non-integrated ownership, an extreme realization of the supply price creates a large temptation to renege on a relational contract. This reneging temptation limits the power of the relational contract that can be implemented under non-integrated ownership. Under integrated ownership, however, we show that the reneging temptation is independent of the supply price, making integration the more efficient governance structure when the supply price can vary widely.
Our second result is that high-powered incentives create bigger reneging temptations under integration than under non-integration. This result is consistent with Williamson's (1985: 76) observation that observed incentives in non-integrated supplier relationships are "higher-powered" than incentives in firms. In a relational contract, the downstream party promises a bonus. But in the integrated case, the employee has no recourse if the firm asserts that performance was poor and refuses to pay the promised bonus, whereas in the nonintegrated case, if an independent contractor is not paid a promised bonus, she can still extract some payment for the good through bargaining. Reneging on the bonus owed to an independent contractor thus saves only the amount of the bonus over and above the payment that would be determined by such bargaining. The temptation not to pay the bonus is therefore smaller under non-integration than under integration. This reduced temptation makes it credible to promise a larger bonus to an independent contractor than to an employee, consistent with Williamson's claim.
Our final result is that if spot transactions between non-integrated parties are sufficiently attractive then no relational contract is feasible between integrated parties, even if such a relational contract would be more efficient than the spot transactions. This result offers an explanation for why firms might abandon long-term employment relationships in favor of seemingly less-efficient outsourcing, as has been alleged in some of the downsizing episodes of the 1990s. This result is in the spirit of the Coase-Williamson argument that a firm arises only if a spot market would perform sufficiently poorly, but our reasoning is new. In our model, if the surplus from relational employment only slightly exceeds the surplus from spot outsourcing, the reneging temptation will be too great, and the relational employment contract will not be self-enforcing.
To prove these three results, we impose additional assumptions on the model developed in Section 2. We assume henceforth that the vector of actions has two components, a=(a 1 , a 2 ), and that the production functions q(a) and p(a) and the cost function c(a) are: q(a) = q 1 a 1 + q 2 a 2 , p(a) = p 1 a 1 + p 2 a 2 , and c(a) = 1 2 a 1 2 + 1 2 a 2 2 , where q 1 , q 2 , p 1 , p 2 ≥ 0. This model nests the two examples we solve at the end of this section:
(1) one-dimensional effort (q 2 = p 2 = 0), where attempts to increase the probability of realizing the high alternative-use value (P H ) also increase the probability of the high downstream value (Q H ), and (2) unproductive multitasking (q 2 = p 1 = 0), where attempts to influence P are costly but have no effect on Q, and so strictly reduce social surplus. Other values of q 1 , q 2 , p 1 , and p 2 capture cases such as academics, where research contributes to internal and external productivity (q 1 , p 1 > 0) but administration contributes only to internal value (q 2 > p 2 = 0).
As noted above, the first-best actions maximize Q L + q(a) ∆Q -c(a), so we can now derive that a 1 * = q 1 ∆Q and a 2 * = q 2 ∆Q.
Under spot outsourcing, however, the upstream party maximizes 1 2 (Q L +P L ) + 1 2 q(a) ∆Q + 1 2 p(a) ∆P -c(a), so we have a 1 SO = 1 2 q 1 ∆Q + 1 2 p 1 ∆P and a 2 SO = 1 2 q 2 ∆Q + 1 2 p 2 ∆P.
Under spot employment the upstream party has no incentive to take costly actions and so chooses a 1 SE = a 2 SE = 0. Finally, in a relational contract where ∆b ≡ b H -b L and ∆β ≡ β H -β L , the upstream party maximizes (s+ b L +β L ) + q(a) ∆b + p(a) ∆β -c(a), so we have a 1 R = q 1 ∆b + p 1 ∆β and a 2 R = q 2 ∆b + p 2 ∆β, where "R" connotes a relational contracts (and will be replaced by either "RO" for relational outsourcing or "RE" for relational employment below).
We can now state formal versions of our three results. After stating each result we give an informal discussion; all proofs are presented in Appendix 2.
Result 1:
Vertical integration is an efficient response to widely varying supply prices. Formally, given q 1 , q 2 , p 1 , p 2 , ∆Q, and r there exists ∆P* such that if ∆P > ∆P* then the downstream party owns the asset in the efficient governance structure.
In our model of relational outsourcing, the upstream party could consign the good to its alternative use, so current market conditions (that is, realizations of P L or P H ) play an important role in determining whether the parties will honor the relational-outsourcing contract. In contrast, under relational employment, current market conditions do not affect the reneging decision because the downstream owner can simply take the good, without any restitution to the upstream party whatsoever. This distinction is clear from the reneging constraints: ∆P appears in the constraint for relational outsourcing, (12), but not in the constraint for relational employment, (8).
This difference between relational outsourcing and employment contracts offers an explanation for Carlton's (1979: 189) observation that companies vertically integrate to reduce uncertainty of supply.
It has always been somewhat of a mystery why businessmen, as well as researchers, so often conclude that the significant force explaining . . . vertical integration . . . has been the desire to obtain a more certain supply of inputs.
Our model offers a novel answer to this puzzle: it is not the ex ante uncertainty associated with a volatile market price that is avoided by vertical integration, but rather the ex post temptation to renege on a relational contract. 13 When the market price is highly variable, the upstream producer faces a large temptation to renege when the price is high, and the downstream consumer faces the symmetric temptation when the price is low. This makes it difficult to 13 In our model, a high ∆P represents a large variability in the value of the good in its next best use, assuming that this alternative value is still less than the internal value. We interpret a high ∆P as meaning that the "outside market price" of the good is highly variable.
sustain a relational-outsourcing contract. By vertically integrating (having the downstream party buy the asset, and thus the residual rights to the output), the market price no longer serves as a temptation to either party. Klein (1996) and Klein and Murphy (1997) note that the recent wave of large vertical mergers in the pharmaceuticals and entertainment industries has followed major shifts in the market environments. They argue that this vertical integration is a response to "hold up"
problems that occur when changing market conditions "place the relationship outside the selfenforcing range." Our formal model is consistent with their intuition: vertical integration dominates relational outsourcing when market conditions (∆P) become highly variable.
Result 2:
Incentives in relational-outsourcing contracts are "higher-powered" than incentives in relational-employment contracts. Formally, given q 1 , q 2 , p 1 , p 2 , ∆Q, ∆P, and r, if the most efficient employment contract yields a 1 RE < a 1 * and a 2 RE < a 2 * then either the most efficient outsourcing contract yields a 1 RO > a 1 RE and a 2 RO > a 2 RE , or no relational-outsourcing contract exists.
Recall that under relational employment, the employee has no recourse if the downstream party asserts that performance was poor and refuses to pay the promised bonus, whereas in a relational-outsourcing contract an independent contractor owns the asset and can dictate its use.
This improved fall-back position for the upstream party means that she can extract a positive payment after the downstream party reneges. Thus, the temptation for the downstream party to renege is not the full amount of the payment, but only the difference between this promised payment and the bargaining outcome. This reduced temptation means that the downstream party under relational outsourcing can promise a larger bonus than under relational employment.
More formally, in our model of relational outsourcing, the upstream party's actions are determined by ∆b and ∆β-these are the "bonuses" paid for achieving high realizations of Q and P, respectively. Therefore, holding ∆b and ∆β fixed, the total surplus from relational outsourcing does not depend on who owns the asset. But the temptation to renege, shown on the left-hand sides of (8) and (12), does depend on asset ownership. In particular, if strong incentives are desirable (i.e., ∆b> 1 2 ∆Q and ∆β> 1 2 ∆P) then the total reneging temptation is smaller under relational outsourcing than under relational employment (namely, |∆b -1 2 ∆Q| + |∆β -1 2 ∆P| rather than |∆b| + |∆β|). Thus, when strong incentives are desirable, relational employment is an inefficient governance mechanism compared to relational outsourcing.
Result 2 corresponds to a thought experiment: fix the environment, measure the incentives in the optimal organizational form, and consider what incentives would emerge if the organizational form were changed. But an empirical test along these lines would require that non-optimal organizational forms exist in the given environment. Fortunately, a related result also holds: choose a dataset with a narrow range of environments in which both relational outsourcing and employment exist; in this narrow range of environments, outsourcing contracts will have higher-powered incentives than employment contracts.
Result 3:
Relational outsourcing and employment contracts cannot exist if spot governance offers an inferior but sufficiently palatable alternative. Formally, given q 1 , q 2 , p 1 , p 2 , ∆Q, and ∆P, there exists r* such that if r > r* then no values of ∆b and ∆β satisfy either the reneging constraint (8) approaching the first-best surplus S*. But these large values of ∆b and ∆β also produce a large temptation to renege. At a sufficiently high value of r, this large (current) temptation to renege outweighs the large (future) surplus.
So far, the argument is standard: in the vast majority of repeated-game models, a sufficiently high value of r prevents the existence of a first-best relational contract. But the Result says that no relational contract is feasible, whether close to first-best or only slightly more efficient than spot governance. The latter occurs because S SO is strictly positive, so the values of ∆b and ∆β that yield S RO (∆b, ∆β) slightly larger than S SO are strictly positive. These positive values of ∆b and ∆β create a positive temptation to renege, even though the surplus from relational employment is only slightly larger than the surplus from spot outsourcing. 14 14 Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) establish a similar result involving compensation contracts: relational contracts are feasible only if formal contracts are sufficiently inferior. MacLeod and Malcolmson (1989) anticipated part of this result, by showing that surplus is necessary for a relational contract to exist. Relative to their result, there are two innovations in our two papers. First, we endogenize the performance of the spot-governance alternative to a relational contract. That is, rather than taking the payoffs from spot governance to be exogenous, we derive these payoffs in the same economic environment in which we analyze relational contracts. Second, we show that in our models surplus is necessary but not sufficient.
Example 1: One-dimensional Effort
Suppose that q 2 = p 2 = 0: the upstream party takes a single action, a; the probability of realizing Q = Q H is q(a) = qa; the probability of realizing P = P H is p(a) = pa; disutility of effort is c(a) = 1 2 a 2 . In Figure 2 we plot the efficient organizational form for this example, as a function of r and ∆P.
SPOT OUTSOURCING AND EMPLOYMENT: The upstream party's action under spot outsourcing, a SO = 1 2 q∆Q + 1 2 p∆P, is first-best when q∆Q = p∆P (shown towards the left of the figure) . At this point, of course, no relational contract can provide additional surplus beyond that delivered by spot outsourcing, and so relational contracts are not feasible at any discount rate. To the left of this point, when p∆P < q∆Q, spot outsourcing provides inefficiently low incentives. This means that, at sufficiently low discount rates, relational outsourcing provides enough added surplus to be self-enforcing. When discount rates are very low, first-best relational-outsourcing contracts are feasible; when they are somewhat higher, second-best relational-outsourcing contracts are feasible. The figure shows how the efficient organizational form varies with the discount rate (r) and the difference between the high and low market valuations (∆P), assuming that p=q=1. Given r, no relational-outsourcing contract is feasible if spot outsourcing is sufficiently close to first-best. At sufficiently low r, relational outsourcing and employment contracts can achieve the first-best. As r increases, relational employment degenerates into spot employment and relational outsourcing into spot outsourcing. Relational employment dominates relational outsourcing if and only if spot employment dominates spot outsourcing.
outsourcing and relational employment provides more surplus than relational outsourcing: the downstream party owns the asset when ∆P is large.
SPOT AND RELATIONAL EMPLOYMENT: The boundary between spot and relational employment is independent of ∆P. In both of these organizational forms, the downstream party owns the asset, so the upstream party cannot threaten to sell the good in its alternative use. Thus, along this boundary, the outside price (P H or P L ) is irrelevant to the determination of the optimal organizational form.
Example 2: Unproductive Multitasking
Suppose that q 2 = p 1 = 0: the upstream party takes a pair of actions, a=(a 1 ,a 2 ); the probability of realizing Q = Q H is q(a) = qa 1 ; the probability of realizing P = P H is p(a) = pa 2 ; disutility of effort is c(a) = 1 2 a 1 2 + 1 2 a 2 2 . In Figure 3 we plot the efficient organizational form for this example, again as a function of r and ∆P.
SPOT OUTSOURCING AND EMPLOYMENT: In this example, the upstream party's action under spot outsourcing is never first-best, because spot outsourcing always provides too little incentive for a 1 and too much incentive (except when ∆P=0) for a 2 . Thus, unlike in Example 1, it is always possible (with sufficiently low r) to devise a self-enforcing relational contract. The figure shows how the efficient organizational form varies with the discount rate (r) and the difference between the high and low market valuations (∆P), assuming that p=q=1. efficient) total incentives than a relational outsourcing, relational outsourcing will not be observed unless it delivers a lower reneging temptation than would relational employment.
Raising r, which changes neither the surplus from the contracts nor the (one-period) payoff from reneging, causes the relational contract with the greater reneging temptation to become infeasible sooner, hence the transition from relational employment to outsourcing in the figure as r increases. Of course, consistent with Result 3, additional increases in r make all relational contracts infeasible.
Concluding Remarks
This paper integrates two prominent strands of the literature on the theory of the firm:
asset ownership and relational contracting. This integration allows us to re-run the Coase-
Williamson horse race between markets and firms with four horses rather than two. Because others have explored asset ownership (e.g., Grossman and Hart), relational contracts within firms (e.g., Kreps), and relational contracts between firms (e.g., Klein and Leffler), we focus on comparing relational contracts within firms to those between. Our main proposition is that asset ownership affects the parties' temptations to renege on a relational contract, so the integration decision is determined in part by the different relational contracts facilitated by asset ownership. We also derive three related results: (1) vertical integration can be an efficient response to widely varying supply prices; (2) high-powered incentives create bigger reneging temptations under integration than under non-integration; and (3) relational contracts may not be feasible if spot governance offers an inferior but sufficiently palatable alternative.
In this section we consider four additional issues: the sociological literature on the formal and informal aspects of organizational design; how our approach might be applied to understanding other organizational forms; the implications of our analysis for internal organizational processes; and a role for managers in the economic theory of the firm.
Formal vs. Informal Aspects of Organizational Structure
Organizational sociologists have long emphasized the distinction between formal and informal aspects of organizational structure. Formal aspects include official job descriptions and reporting relationships, as well as formal contracts (i.e., contracts that can be enforced by a court). Informal aspects include norms and mutual understandings, as well as network structures among individuals (i.e., who you know in the organization besides the people to whom you have formal reporting ties). Roughly speaking, the formal structure is the organization chart, whereas the informal structure is the way things really work. As Granovetter (1985: 502) notes:
The distinction between the 'formal' and the 'informal' organization of the firm is one of the oldest in the literature, and it hardly needs repeating that observers who assume firms to be structured in fact by the official organization chart are sociological babes in the woods. Blau and Scott (1962: 6) go further, asserting that formal and informal aspects not only coexist but interact:
It is impossible to understand the nature of a formal organization without investigating the networks of informal relations and the unofficial norms as well as the formal hierarchy of authority and the official body of rules, since the formally instituted and the informal emerging patterns are inextricably intertwined.
Asset ownership is a formal aspect of organizational structure; relational contracts are informal. By integrating the two in a single economic model, we are catching up with the
sociologists. Yet there is value added by our economic approach: because ownership and relational contracts interact (rather than just co-exist), we can choose the former to facilitate the latter, thereby optimizing overall organizational performance. As we describe in the next two sub-sections, there are many potential applications of this idea.
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Other Organizational Forms
In this paper we analyze the four organizational forms shown in Figure 1 , devoting most of our attention to the two on the bottom row: relational employment and relational outsourcing. While these four organizational forms expand and clarify the traditional distinction between markets and firms, they only hint at the variety of forms now much discussed in the business and organizational literatures, including joint ventures, strategic alliances, networks, business groups, clans, and virtual organizations. 16 Unlike the business PAGE 27 and organizational literatures, however, the economics literature has not had much to say about these non-standard organizational forms. Furthermore, where these forms have received theoretical attention from economists, the focus has typically been on asset ownership and other formal aspects of organizational structure.
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We suspect that informal aspects, especially relational contracts, are important to the success of these non-traditional organizational forms. We also suspect that the formal and informal aspects interact, creating another opportunity to choose the former to facilitate the latter. Although the model in this paper has only two stages of production with one party at each stage, richer models could add both parties and stages. For example, one could begin to model a joint venture as two parties at one stage who create an asset at the other stage which they control by both formal and informal means. Similarly, one could begin to model a business group as several parties at several stages of production, with both cross-ownership and relational contracts linking the parties, possibly through a central party. We expect that formal structures such as fifty-fifty ownership in joint ventures or minority stock holdings in business groups will be better understood using models that study the interplay between these formal structures and the informal relational contracts between the parties.
Internal Organizational Processes
Of course, the interplay between formal and informal organizational structures is not limited to relationships between firms; there are several applications of this idea within firms.
In this sub-section we argue that subjective judgments, and consequently parties' reputations, play crucial roles in organizational processes such as transfer pricing, capital allocation, compensation, and corporate governance. That is, organizational processes have important informal aspects; they are not simple exercises in formal contracting, as they often appear in the economics literature. We suspect that these informal aspects can be hampered or facilitated by formal organizational structures, such as whether the firm is organized by function versus division, whether its jobs are defined for individuals or teams, and so on. Thus, as in the previous sub-section, we again envision a class of models in which formal organizational structures interact with informal relational contracts.
Early research on transfer pricing (e.g., Hirshleifer, 1956; Gould, 1964) treated the problem as one of trying to recreate the market inside the firm, so that decentralized agents will face incentives that produce efficient resource allocation. But Holmstrom and Tirole (1991) note that "a major deficiency of the incentive pricing approach is that it overlooks the reasons why trade is internal in the first place." Furthermore, Eccles (1985) conducted an extensive field study of transfer pricing practices and found that the standard economic model of transfer pricing is not a good description of how transfer pricing systems actually work. In brief,
Eccles found that transfer prices are rarely used to allocate resources. Instead, he found that the rights to allocate resources are held centrally, with the transfer pricing scheme serving as part of the performance measurement and incentive system for the divisions. Our model is consistent with Eccles's findings. Under relational employment, the transfer payment does not serve to allocate resources or transfer ownership in the good produced, because the good was already owned by the downstream party. Rather, the purpose of the transfer payment is to provide incentives for the upstream party to take actions that make the good more valuable
downstream. In our model, the transfer payment is part of an ongoing informal system that relies on the parties' reputations.
Similarly, the economic literatures on capital budgeting and compensation typically conceive of these processes as if they were mediated by formal rules and contracts. But for many years, observers of these processes inside real organizations have insisted that the official rules and procedures regarding capital budgeting and compensation are a terribly incomplete description of those activities (just as the organization chart fails to capture much of the organization's true structure). Bower (1970) discusses the role of subjectivity, judgment, and reputation in the determination of divisional capital allocations. Lawler (1971) stresses that compensation determination rarely relies exclusively on objective measures of performance, and that managerial subjectivity and judgment are an essential part of pay systems. As with transfer pricing, capital budgeting and compensation are informal systems that rely on subjective judgment and parties' reputations.
As a final example of subjectivity in organizational processes, consider corporate governance. One of the original motivations for agency theory was to model the relationship between managers and investors. Beginning with Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Holmstrom (1979) , this literature analyzes formal contracts based on verifiable performance measures. But when we look for examples of principal-agent situations that conform to this contracting model, we find them in a somewhat unexpected place: the legal entity known as a Limited Partnership (LP). In an LP, the general partner (the agent) agrees to a legally enforceable formal contract with the limited partners (the principals) specifying the distribution of proceeds from whatever projects the LP takes on. There is almost never a board of directors in a Limited
Partnership, and there is no need for one: the distribution of proceeds is done by formal contract.
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A typical Corporation differs significantly from a Limited Partnership in terms of the contracting process governing the distribution of value between the principals (the shareholders) and the agents (management). An executive compensation contract in a corporation almost always gives significant discretion to the board of directors in determining both the size and timing of payouts (see Kole, 1997) . Similarly, the authority for the distribution of corporate proceeds through dividends rests with the board of directors. But what does the board do? We argue that the board designs and implements a relational contract between management and the shareholders. Using a variety of objective and subjective measures of performance, the board attempts to disentangle the effects of management's actions from those of luck (Lorsch and McIver, 1994) and to eliminate distortions induced by accounting-based measures of performance (Dechow, Huson, and Sloan, 1994) . 19 Like the other processes described above, corporate governance is best viewed as the result of interaction between formal and informal systems.
Management and the Nature of the Firm
We find it curious that most of the literature on the theory of the firm makes little reference to managers. By emphasizing the importance of relational contracts, our model highlights a role for managers: the development and maintenance of relational contracts, both in firms and in supplier relationships. In our model, this role involves designing the relational contract (that is, determining what the observable but non-contractible Q's and P's should be, as well as determining the optimal b's and β's), communicating this to employees, assessing 19 Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) argue that three economic problems-asset specificity, difficulty with performance measurement, and uncertainty-are exogenous parameters that determine the endogenously chosen set of instruments that define a firm. The present paper has explored how relational contracts can mitigate problems stemming from asset specificity. Our earlier paper (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 1994) showed how relational contracts based on subjective performance evaluations could mitigate problems stemming from distortionary objective measures of performance. Thus it would be natural to develop a third model in which the board of directors implements a relational contract that disentangles the effects of management's actions from those of uncertainty.
outcomes (that is, observing the Q's and P's), and deciding whether to honor the relational contract (that is, properly evaluating the reneging constraints). In our model these tasks are trivial; in reality each requires judgment and knowledge of the specifics of complex situations.
Furthermore, hard as these tasks are in practice, much evidence suggests that changing a relational contract is harder still: managers must end one relational contract but preserve enough credibility to begin another.
Our model makes some progress towards answering the classic question: What is a firm? Simon (1951) argued that relational contracts were at the center of the employment relation, and Williamson (1975) argued that relational contracts were the key differentiator of firms from markets. But many others (cited above) have noted the importance of relational contracts across organizational boundaries. Thus, while relational contracts have an august pedigree in the literature as a component of what makes a nexus of contracts "firm-like," they cannot be all that defines a firm. 20 Grossman and Hart, on the other hand, define a firm as a collection of commonly owned assets (residual rights of control) without reference to relational contracts.
This approach is at odds with the enormous literature on informal organizational structures, and also raises the problem of how firms manage non-contractibles (on which more below).
Integrating these two traditions produces the four organizational forms summarized in Figure   1 . We contend that vertically integrated relationships mediated by relational contracts (the lower-right box in Figure 1 , relational employment) are the most "firm-like," while arm'slength relationships among non-integrated parties (the upper-left box, spot outsourcing) are the most "market-like."
We are not arguing that management occurs only in firms. To the contrary, we have emphasized that management is crucial in ongoing supply relationships (the lower-left box: relational outsourcing). Nor are we arguing that firms cannot occur without management. We can imagine firms that fit the Grossman-Hart model (the upper-right box: spot employment), in which all non-contractible rights of control are held by a single individual. But if these rights become too numerous and complex to be held by a single individual, the firm must have some mechanism to coordinate their exercise, and because these rights are not contractible, their exercise cannot be controlled by formal contracts. Rather, the exercise of non-contractible rights must be coordinated by relational contracts. In short, the firm must have managers. We 20 We are persuaded by Demsetz (1991) to avoid attempts at strict definition of the firm, and so follow his advice to describe a nexus of contracts as more "firm-like" or "market-like."
conclude that understanding the role of managers, who design and implement the relational contracts that underpin informal organizational processes, is essential to understanding firms.
After similar substitution, these four constraints can be rewritten as: All eight constraints will not be binding simultaneously; in fact at most two constraints will be binding. For example, suppose that ∆b> 1 2 ∆Q and ∆β> 1 2 ∆P. Then, if (A1.1a) is satisfied, the other downstream constraints (A1.1b), (A1.1c), and (A1.1d) will also be satisfied. Similarly, if (A1.2d) is satisfied then (A1.2a), (A1.2b), and (A1.2c) will also be satisfied. Thus, when ∆b> 1 2 ∆Q and ∆β> 1 2 ∆P, the relevant constraints are (A1.1a) and (A1.2d); if these two are satisfied then the other constraints are satisfied as well. Applying similar logic yields the following pairs of "relevant" constraints:
When ∆b> 1 2 ∆ Q and ∆β> 1 2 ∆P, the relevant constraints are:
When ∆b> 1 2 ∆ Q and ∆β< 1 2 ∆P, the relevant constraints are:
When ∆b< 1 2 ∆ Q and ∆β> 1 2 ∆P, the relevant constraints are:
When ∆b< 1 2 ∆ Q and ∆β< 1 2 ∆P, the relevant constraints are: choose ∆P' to be the larger root of the quadratic.
Lemma 2: Too strong an incentive based on the alternative-use value makes relational outsourcing inferior to spot employment. That is, given q 1 , q 2 , p 1 , p 2 , and ∆Q there exists ∆β' such that, for any ∆b, if ∆β > ∆β' then S RO -S SE < 0.
Proof: 2(S RO -S SE ) = (q 1 2 + q 2 2 )∆b(2∆Q -∆b) + 2(p 1 q 1 + p 2 q 2 )(∆Q -∆b)∆β -(p 1 2 + p 2 2 ) ∆β 2 . Maximize the first term with respect to ∆b ≥ 0 (at ∆b = ∆Q); maximize the second term with respect to ∆b ≥ 0 (at ∆b = 0). Now choose ∆β' to be the larger root of the resulting quadratic, with the maximized versions of the first and second terms replacing the originals.
Lemma 3: Too large a variation in the alternative-use value makes relational outsourcing infeasible. That is, given q 1 , q 2 , p 1 , p 2 , ∆Q, and r there exists ∆P'' such that if ∆P > ∆P'' then the reneging constraint (12) for relational outsourcing fails.
Proof: Choose ∆P'' such that 1 2 ∆P'' > ∆β' + (S* -S SE )/r, where S* is the first-best surplus.
Then ∆β > ∆β' implies that S RO -S SE < 0, by Lemma 2, so S RO -max{S Result 1: Vertical integration is an efficient response to widely varying supply prices. Formally, given q 1 , q 2 , p 1 , p 2 , ∆Q, and r there exists ∆P* such that if ∆P > ∆P* then the downstream party owns the asset in the efficient governance structure.
Proof: Given Lemmas 1 and 3, Result 1 follows by setting ∆P* = max{∆P', ∆P''}: because ∆P > ∆P', spot outsourcing is not efficient; because ∆P > ∆P'', relational outsourcing is not feasible.
Lemma 4: For sufficiently high r, the only possible relational-employment contract is the trivial case of ∆b = ∆β = 0 (i.e., replication of spot employment). That is, given q 1 , q 2 , p 1 , p 2 , ∆Q and ∆P there exists r D * such that if r > r D * then no values of ∆b and ∆β satisfy the reneging constraint (8) except ∆b = ∆β = 0.
Proof: The reneging constraint (8) Lemma 5: For sufficiently high r, the only possible relational-outsourcing contract is the trivial case of ∆b = 1 2 ∆Q and ∆β = 1 2 ∆P (i.e., replication of spot outsourcing). That is, given q 1 , q 2 , p 1 , p 2 , ∆Q and ∆P there exists r U * such that if r > r U * then no values of ∆b and ∆β satisfy the reneging constraint (12) except ∆b = 1 2 ∆Q and ∆β = 1 2 ∆P. increase the lefthand side of (A2.2), but the righthand side is constant, so the reneging constraint (12) fails except at ∆b = 1 2 ∆Q and ∆β = 1 2 ∆P.
Let L U (∆b, ∆β) denoted the lefthand side of (A2.2). This is done in Lemma 7.
Let r U * be the maximum of (q 1 2 + q 2 2 )∆Q, (p 1 q 1 + p 2 q 2 )∆Q, and the two other values of r determined above. Then for r > r U * we have that (A2.2) fails and hence that (12) fails, except perhaps at ∆b = 1 2 ∆Q and ∆β = 1 2 ∆P.
Lemma 6: Too strong an incentive based on the alternative-use value makes relational outsourcing inferior to spot outsourcing. That is, given q 1 , q 2 , p 1 , p 2 , and ∆Q there exists ∆β'' such that, for any ∆b, if ∆β > ∆β'' then S RO -S SO < 0.
Proof: 2(S RO -S SO ) = K(∆b) + 2(p 1 q 1 + p 2 q 2 )(∆Q -∆b)∆β -(p 1 2 + p 2 2 ) ∆β 2 . As in the proof of Lemma 2, maximize K(∆b) with respect to ∆b ≥ 0, and maximize the second term with respect to ∆b ≥ 0 (at ∆b = 0). Now choose ∆β'' to be the larger root of the resulting quadratic, with the maximized versions of the first and second terms replacing the originals.
